Introduction
The world in which venture investments take place is marked by uncertainty about future market conditions. That is, future cash flows are unknown in amount and timing and two parties analysing the same deal might come to different conclusions due to either disagreement about future potential of the funded firm, conflict of interest or asymmetric information between the investment firms involved.
Venture Capital providers therefore face paramount challenges in coping with the inherent characteristics such as tremendous uncertainty over the future outcome, differences in perception of entrepreneurs and investors over managerial actions that have to be pursued along with a low level of tangible assets that makes liquidation as a downside protection problematic. Additionally, the high levels of uncertainty stemming from technological and managerial challenges intensify the use of demanding financial contracts. Venture capital firms strive to overcome these issues by monitoring and control aspects during the process of financing and employ various sophisticated arrangements including convertible securities, staged investments with milestones or round financing along with anti-dilution protection and control mechanisms over the exit to cope with the issues of asymmetric information in all phases of the financing life cycle. Among the various techniques employed in Venture Capital financing the successive infusion of capital is one of the strongest control mechanisms to help venture capital providers to overcome the asymmetric information problem faced (Sahlman (1990) ).
In this paper I investigate the role of round financing as a device for monitoring and staging of investments in venture capital. Moreover, paying attention to the fact that investments are made by syndicates of investors I link the results found with respect to the nature of staging by multiple investors to the recent literature on venture capital syndication.
In a first step I analyse the impacts on the decision whether an investment is made in stages or not. One would expect the degree of asymmetric information to rise with higher uncertainty. As a consequence, mechanisms of staging and monitoring are more likely to be put in place by the VC provider to control the entrepreneurs effort with more pronounced information asymmetries. The data reveals that the riskiness of the venture and the possible lack of a corporate history makes it more difficult for the financing firm to judge upon future prospects. If an investment is made in an earlier stage of the financing life cycle, the risk of failing is much higher than in later stages and therefore VC firms tend to portion their payments into successive stages rather providing a lump sum payment upfront. Staging the capital infusions becomes more important when more intangible assets are associated with the investment.
Moreover, the size of the funding rounds and along with the total number of funding events is an important measure of stage financing. The number of funding rounds is positively related to the inherent uncertainty over the expected future outcome and to the expected agency costs. The need to make more intensive use of staging and monitoring becomes more pronounced in earlier stages of the investment life cycle. VC providers get to know more about the company over the lifetime of their relationship and also the portfolio companies themselves can show their ability to generate money, which lowers the incentive for monitoring. So in the earlier years of collaboration between the Venture Capital provider and the financed firm the need for monitoring and staging is higher.
In order to test which VC firms are more likely to invest in stages I analyze the impact of the VC characteristics on the use of stage financing. I do not find evidence that certain groups of VC firms differ with respect to the general use of staging mechanisms when financing young start-ups. However, I find that firms with larger fund volume and more funds invested in Germany are more likely to make use of staging, which indicates that more experienced VCs are more likely to make use of staging. In addition, I find that firms more active in the German market are less prone to make use of staging as a risk mitigation tool. This confirms the hypothesis on staging as a risk mitigation (monitoring) device since VC firms with more experience in Germany can be assumed to have acquired more experience with local particularities and access to deal flow. For VC firms more acquainted with the German VC market, monitoring activities cannot add as much value and as such, the extent to which staging is used as a mechanism for downside protection is limited.
In a next step I augment the analysis of staging mechanisms by looking at the intersection of staging and joint investment activity. With respect to the influence of staging on syndication activities I find that a VC firm with a higher average number of financing rounds employed is also more likely to syndicate an investment with a partner VC. Firms that realize the benefit of staging might on the same turn realize the value added in financing Start Ups by involving partners to create complementarities in managing and advising the funded firms as well as by combining financial resources. My analysis finds support for the results of Fluck, Garrison and Myers (2005) who show that later stage syndication of venture capital investments can alleviate the agency problems between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur. Fluck et al point out that the commitment to syndicate can protect the entrepreneur from dilution and thus mitigates the problem of hold-up. The commitment to syndicate therefore assures a higher effort of the entrepreneur and yields more favourable financing terms in return. Consequently, VC firms that make use of staging are also more open to syndication.
With respect to the intensity of monitoring and staging I find that the duration of financing rounds increases in later stages of investment. Thus, when an investment is made in the Start Up stage money is provided for a shorter period of time. When the investment is, however, made in a later stage the duration is longer. This suggests that the VC providers get to know more about the company over the lifetime of their relationship. Additionally, I find evidence for an effect of joint decision making on mitigating agency conflicts between the VC provider and the entrepreneur. Involving partners into the decision-making process increases the duration of the financing round and reduces the incentive to monitor the firm more closely. This suggests evidence for Lerner's Selection Hypothesis (1994) according to which the evaluation of the same venture proposal by different VC companies operating in a syndicate reduces the potential danger of adverse selection. Thus, one can see that if the evaluation process before the selection of an investment opportunity is undertaken by more than one venture capitalist, the duration of the financing round increases.
Concerning the amount provided I find that for younger firms less capital is provided. The later the stage of investment and the more the management of the firm has been able to prove their skills the higher will the amount be that the venture firms invest. Concerning the effect of joint investment activity I show that the amount provided for the funded companies is increasing when more than a single VC firm makes the investment. This again, emphasizes the alleviation of agency problems in the VC -Entrepreneur relationship. The evaluation of the venture proposal by different VC companies operating in a syndicate reduces adverse selection and consequently, the decision making process becomes more efficient and leads to better results if the project is only undertaken when approved by two or more parties. Thus, the involvement of a partner increases the confidence of the VCs in the funded firm and leads them to provide more financing on average.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 1 I will summarize the related literature. Chapter 2 introduces the data set used in this paper. In Chapter 3 I will discuss the factors impacting the staging and monitoring of Venture Capital investments and present and discuss the implications of the regression results. Chapter 4 concludes.
Related Literature: The Role of Capital Staging
Control mechanisms in Venture Capital financing have been analysed in several dimensions. Lerner (1994) , Manigart et al. (2005) as well as Hopp and Rieder (2005) provide evidence on the use of syndicates to better allocate financial and intangible resources in different geographical areas. Kaplan and Stroemberg (2004) elaborate on the role of convertible securities in managing the double moral hazard problem. The structure of venture capital financing has been described in Sahlman (1990) and Gompers (1995) further shows the importance of the staged structure of financing in the presence of agency and monitoring costs.
There are numerous studies dealing with the theoretical arguments on when and how Venture Capitalists should employ staging mechanisms alongside with empirical work investigating the observable determinants of the successive infusion of capital. Sahlman (1990) points out that when the investment is staged and the capital infusions take place in smaller increments, rather an involving a large upfront payment, the prospects of the firm are re-evaluated on an ongoing basis. The nature of staged investments corresponds to a multi-option problem, as the initial investment leads to the exercise of follow-on investment opportunities. Therefore they can not be seen as independent investments but have to be seen as a chain of interrelated decisions, where the earlier ones are prerequisites for later ones [Amram and Kulatilaka (1999) ]. The opportunity to abandon will occur more than once during the life of the project, as management can determine after each completed stage, that it would be optimal not to go on with the project, and thus could avoid value destruction by sticking to the course of action. When management decides to stop a project after a certain stage, it will not have to incur the installment cost necessary to further develop the funded company.
According to Gompers (2004) the shorter the duration of the financing rounds the more frequent the monitoring activities of the VC provider and the greater is the necessity to gather additional information. Staging the capital infusion enables the VC to keep the entrepreneur on a tight leash. The more likely conflicts with the entrepreneur are and the more pronounced the effect of uncertainty over the expected outcome is, the shorter should the duration of financing rounds be. Accordingly, the value of oversight will be more important for firms with higher asymmetric information problems (Gompers (2004) ).
Concerning the role of venture capital providers, one can presume that the use of a staged financial structure can be as important as the pure provision of capital. Overcoming the problem of asymmetric information and monitoring the activities of portfolio firms can be valuable as well. Fluck et al. (2005) point out that staged financing benefits the venture capitalist in two ways. First of all it can block the entrepreneur's incentive to continue investing in bad projects to generate private benefits and secondly, it allows the VC to exploit the venture's real option value by being able to stop investing once the venture turns out to be less successful than expected. For younger and higher risk firms staging the investment can thus provide a benefit not only for the venture capital provider but also for the entrepreneur who benefits from the additional input brought in by the VC beyond the pure amount of capital injected. Wang and Zhou (2002) also argue that staging reduces the cost associated with bad information (the real option value of abandonment) and decreases the agency costs of moral hazard. As such, staging can solve different purposes in early and later rounds. Davila et al. (2003) emphasize that first round investments are intended to provide capital to a cash constraint entrepreneur while late stage financing is intended to overcome information asymmetries and to mitigate the agency conflicts present in the relationship between the VC and the entrepreneur. The early stage investment is therefore characterized by uncertainty over the future outcome and VC providers can limit their downside exposure by not committing all capital upfront and keeping their option to abandon alive. Once the portfolio firm makes progress in developing products and management structures the VC can permanently update its information and can commit further capital to promote growth. In this sense staging also functions as a control mechanism. Gompers (1995) shows that venture capital firms concentrate their investments in early stage and high technology companies. Moreover, the use of staging increases with a higher level of asset intangibility and greater intensity of R&D activities. VC providers therefore have to be able to frequently monitor the actions of the funded firm and update their information in order to keep the option to discontinue investing alive. Bergemann and Hege (1998) present a model of VC staging using a real option argument, where the wealth constrained entrepreneur posses' private information while being funded from an external capital provider. Bergemann and Hege show that staging can reduce the imposed moral hazard problem and align the interests of both parties. Unfortunately, the model exhibits the unpleasant characteristics that unsuccessful projects receive the most funding. In practice, however, the opposite case can be found (see for example Gompers (1995) ).
Neher (1999) compares staged funding to an arm's length transaction (upfront payment) and finds that once the initial investment is made (and the relationship exhibits a hold up problem) staging can mitigate the agency conflict and stimulate the entrepreneur to put in more effort in order to increase the value of the venture. In addition the more crucial the entrepreneur's human capital for the project success is, the more advantageous will be the staging effort.
In line with the results found in Gompers (1995 ) Davila et al. (2003 find that the amount of funding provided by the VC differs significantly between early and late stage rounds. Consequently, a larger amount of funding at a later stage does stipulate a higher growth for the portfolio company. According to Davila et al. the funding events do not only present a pure transfer of financial resources but also they are involved in redefining a portfolio company's governance structure and provide signals about the future growth prospects. The data reveals that growth in early rounds only takes place after the funding event but not before. For later stage investment, however, growth is significant before and after the funding event. The value of a funding event acting as a signal therefore becomes less relevant for later stages, whereas the size of the provided amount plays a more important role in stipulating growth. VC providers permit their portfolio 7 companies different growth strategies with varying levels of funding provided. As a consequence those funded firms with a larger cash flow available can invest more heavily and grow faster. Davila et al. conclude that for early rounds the funding event plays a significant role on signalling whereas for later rounds the amount of capital has signalling value.
Gompers (1995) also provides evidence on the relationship between investments made and market liquidity. He shows that when VC firms are able to raise more money for the investment funds, they are investing more money per round in their portfolio firms and also invest more often.
The two commonly employed mechanisms of staged financing are milestones and round financing. In round financing each new capital infusion is negotiated separately, whereas in milestone financing the decision whether to inject new capital is made contingent on the portfolio company meeting predefined targets in terms of product development or financial figures. Talmor and Cuny (2005) analyze various factors impacting the choice between round financing and milestones. They find that if the role of the venture capital provider is more important than the entrepreneur, milestone financing is more efficient than round financing and vice versa. Bienz and Hirsch (2005) analyze the role of milestones versus round financing in the context of German Venture Capital agreements. They arrive at the conclusion that the decision to stage is determined by the inherent uncertainty and the degree of asymmetric information. The form of staging, however, is determined by the predictability of the development process and the anticipated bargaining power of the involved parties. As such, predefined milestones for seed and start-up companies seem to be out of the question as one needs detailed insights and a certain degree of predictability in order to set feasible contingent milestones. For the general results on staging, they find that among the firms where a staged investment strategy is chosen, there are significantly more Life Science and Internet firms. They argue that the higher degree of uncertainty and the fact that those industries are more likely to be research intensive (and therefore the success more heavily depends on the human capital of the entrepreneur) drives the use of staging to monitor entrepreneurial efforts. Milestone financing is used more often with advanced firms, where adequate milestones can be implemented. For younger and inexperienced firms a pure round financing strategy with successive renegotiation is implemented.
However, staging might come at a cost. The lag in implementing the project due to the successive infusion of capital can create additional costs such as longer development cycles, delays in market entry and foregone cash flows as well as foregone economies of scale if the investment has to be split in several tranches. As a consequence, the benefits of staging have to outweigh the associated costs.
In the following I will introduce the data set used and also point to the factors that are likely to impact the VC decision to invest capital successively. In chapter 8 3 I will then use the variables in the regression analysis to make inferences about the driving forces of Venture Capital staging and monitoring. The result is a deal survey exhibiting who has funded a new company and was joined by which partner. Moreover, I collected information about each financing round. As such I can identify which VC company has made an investments into a target firm at which point in time. In addition I supplemented the database with information regarding the VC firms and the funded firms in terms of size, age, industry active in, along with information specific on the actual deal. Therefore it is possible to make more distinct inferences about the driving characteristics of staging patterns at the point of investment.
I used the information from TVE to identify the sector of a particular venture; I make use of the Venture Economics Industry Classification (VEIC) -a Venture Economics proprietary industry classification scheme. Moreover, I reviewed relevant information about the Company Business Description from the TVE database and from the Balance Sheet databases. In order to draw more distinct conclusion I further separated the industries in our sample, which results in finer industry clusters. 1995 -2005 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1995 -2005 Panel 
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Characteristics of the Investment targets
Based on the information identified in the TVE database and the industry classifications I have further collected information on the funded companies to investigate which factors play a decisive role in explaining the syndication behavior. As pointed out in Bygrave (1987) younger firms are more likely to fail and as such firm age at investment can serve as a proxy for the riskiness of a venture. Consequently, I have gathered data about the firms founding date and combined those information with the investment date to arrive at the age of the funded firm at the date of the capital infusion. In addition, I supplemented the data file with information about the size of the investment target at the time of investment. Here I included the sales at the time of the first investment to proxy for the actual size of the firm along with the number of employees at the date of the first capital infusion. The number of employees can on the one hand supplement the sales variable but could also be seen as an indicator for the incorporated human capital of the investment target. Information about the size of the funded firm, measured in terms of sales and employees, have been collected from the Markus and Amadeus Balance Sheet Databases and have been combined with publicly available information from corporate websites. Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of the funded firm. Table 2 reveals that of all the 964 firms included in the sample only 282 firms were subject to round financing, whereas 3 out of 4 deals were only financed with a single lump sum payment. As TVE indicates information about the current status of the firm only in a rare amount of cases with accuracy it could well be that some of the firms went into bankruptcy during the period under investigation. However, without a reliable source of information it has turned out to be impossible to get an accurate estimate on whether all the firms in the sample are still active or whether some have gone bust during the period 1995-2005. As a consequence, I will not make inferences with respect to bankruptcy or successful exits in this paper.
When looking at the differences between the various categories one can infer that among Biotech firms there is a much higher level of staging, with roughly 50% of the deals being financed by multiple rounds, as opposed to, for example, Industrial Products and Service were only 13% and 11% have been financed via multiple sequential financing events.
In addition the table provides information about the constituency of the firm at the time of the first investment. The age of Biotech firms that have been subject to stage financing is significantly lower at the date of investment than for firms where a lump sum payment has occurred. The same effect can be found for firms in the Industrial sector, where firms subject to staging are on average 6 years old, whereas their non-staged counterparts are on average more than 20 years older. The data reveals that differences between the two categories (staged and non-staged) exist. I will later on test more rigorously the influence of the age at the investment on the propensity to stage the capital infusion.
Differences in terms of the size of the firms at their first investment date can also be verified for Biotech and Industrial Products firms. Biotech firms that are subject to staging are roughly twice as large in terms of employees than the firms that are financed by a single payment. Here we can find the opposite effect for the age at the first investment date. For firms in the Industrial Products sector we can infer that firms financed with a single round are way larger than those firms were the investments have been partitioned. We can, however, not confirm this effect for Biotech and Industrial Products in terms of sales at the investment date. Here, the difference between staged and non-staged firms is not found to be significant. Nevertheless, the differences, for Electronic firms and Media firms are found to differ between firms subject to staging and firms financed with lump sum payments. One can learn from the table that Electronic firms not subject to staging are way larger than the firms financed in stages in terms of sales at investment. The opposite effect holds true for firms in the Media and Communication sector, where firms financed in multiple rounds are 4 times larger.
Furthermore, table 2 reveals that the average number of investors differs widely across the industry categories. Biotech and Pharma firms rank top with 5 and 6 investors on average, whereas firms in the Consulting and Industrial Products industry only have 1,6 investors on average when it comes to an investment. Apparently, we can infer significant differences among the industry categories. In the following I will therefore investigate which impact the characteristics of the financed firms have on the financing strategy employed by the Venture Capital providers. Moreover, I will later on test which factors from the VC provider side influence their propensity to employ staging mechanisms. The table reports the Summary Statistics for the funded companies in the sample. The data has been obtained through the use of the Thomson Venture Economics Database and public sources for identifying transactions and the involved parties. Data concerning the size in terms of sales and employees have been collected from Markus and Amadeus Balance Sheet databases. The sample has been partly split into staged and non-staged deals. The subsample contains all venture capital firms for which data concerning sales and employees were obtainable. A t-test for equal means has been undertaken. The column investors reports the average number of investors for the corresponding industry. The number of employees is recorded at the date of the first investment by any VC provider. The sales are measured iń 000 Euros at the date of the first investment by any VC provider. ** denotes significance at the 5% level.
VC Provider Characteristics
I have also included the characteristics of the VC providers to see how those factors impact the decision to stage an investment later on. I classify the companies as being an independent Venture Capitalist if there are no strings to other firms or banks attached. Secondly, I classify VCs as banking dependent when they have been set up by a private bank or a private bank holds more than 50% of the shares. Thirdly, I classify a VC as public if the shares are hold by either the German government or one of the German public banking associations, i.e. Sparkassen or Landesbanken. Moreover, I included Co-Operative VCs if they are associated with one of the so called Volksbanken in Germany. Additionally, I have separated Business Angels and Corporate VCs, with Business Angels being one time investors and Corporate VCs having strings to a large Corporation or when the investee company has been set up by a larger corporation in a spin off, for example. The last category in the dataset are foreign investors, if the VC comes from a foreign origin and did not operate from a German branch. In terms of the total number of firms from a category, the sample comprises 127 Independent VC firms and 182 VC firms with a foreign origin, which are by far the largest groups in the sample. Table 3 reports the characteristics of the VC providers in the sample. One can infer that among the firms that provided capital to young and innovative firms, Foreign and Independent VC firms outnumber the other firms active in the German market. Moreover, those firms turn out to be the firms that focus more on specific industries. TVE provides information about the investment focus for the various investors in the sample. TVE distinguishes between firms that have a focus on Medical/Health and Pharmaceutical companies, Information Technology or Non-High firms. The TVE information on focus industries reveals that among Independent and Foreign Investors, about a third of the firms focus on investments into Information Technology and roughly ten percent focus on Non-High Technology and Medical firms respectively.
However, the largest amount of deals on average has been undertaken by Banking affiliated investors and independent VC firms. Column (5) in table 3 reports the total number of financing events undertaken by a VC firm from each category. Independent VCs have provided by far the largest number of rounds followed by Public VCs.
In addition table 3 also reports the average number of financing rounds for each of the VC categories. Here one can see that especially foreign investor make much more use of staging than VCs from other categories. Business Angels only acted as one time investors and where therefore simply involved in a single round of financing. For further analysis I also describe the investor companies by their Syndication Ratio. The syndication ratio describes the propensity to syndicate of the VC investors in the sample. The propensity of an investor to co-invest is expressed in this paper by its ratio of syndicated investments to the total number of deals undertaken. The higher the Syndication Ratio of an investor, the more he tends to invest in portfolio companies that are funded through a co-investment. A syndication ratio of "0" indicates that the specific investor invested exclusively on his own and was not involved in any co-investment of the sample. Here one can infer that Business Angels syndicate their deals in all cases. Thus, Angel Financing complements the skills of other Venture Capital providers but does not act as an alternative source of financing on its own.
In column (8) 
(8) The table reports the Summary Statistics for the VC providers in the sample. The data has been obtained through the use of the Thomson Venture Economics Database and public sources for identifying transactions and the involved parties. Column (1) gives information about the Total firms belonging to each category. Additionally, columns (2) till (4) give information about the number of VC firms from each category that have an investment focus as indicated by TVE in Non-High Tech firms, Information Technology firms or Medical and Life Science firms respectively. Column (5) reports the total number of transactions that have been undertaken by the VC providers in each category. Column (6) provides information about the Average Number of Financing Rounds per investment undertaken. Column (7) contains information about the Syndication Ratio for each VC category. The Syndication Ratio measures to which extent VC firms make use of joint investment actions and is calculated as the ratio of syndicated investments to the number of total transactions by the respective VC. Column (8) represents the Average Amount of Funding provided by a VC upon investment. It is measured in Mio. Euro. Column (9) presents the Capital under Management for the VC categories and is measured in Mio. Euro. Column (10) gives the sum of total investments made in Germany as indicated by TVE and is measured in Mio.
Euro. Column (11) indicates which percentage of overall investment volume has been undertaken in Germany.
4 The Role of Monitoring and Staging in Venture Capital Financing
The Decision to Invest in Stages
First, I analyze the determinants of the staging decision. From a strategic point of view VC providers should have well defined long-term investment plan that should include the entry as well as the exit strategy. As a matter of fact staging should be the outcome of such an investment plan and we should be able to identify patterns on the investment behaviour of VC firms as a resonance to the characteristics of the investment target.
Early stage investments are characterized by uncertainty over the future outcome and VC providers can limit their downside exposure by not committing all capital upfront and keeping their option to abandon alive. Once the portfolio firm makes progress in developing products and management structures the VC can permanently update its information and can commit further capital to promote growth. One would therefore expect that the higher the uncertainty associated with a deal the higher would be the degree of asymmetric information and as such monitoring and staging mechanisms are more likely to be put in place by the VC provider to control the entrepreneurs effort. In addition, Gompers (1995) finds that for younger firms the staging effect is more pronounced and less capital is provided. Thus, for older firms more information can be gathered and the potential of the venture can be more easily judged upon, which in turn decreases the potential risk taken on by the venture capitalist. As a consequence staging becomes less valuable to the VC provider. Gompers (2004) stresses the importance of asset characteristics to proxy the expected agency costs. Staging the capital infusions becomes more important when more intangible assets are associated with the investment. In case of liquidation the recovery value will be higher for the VC the larger the percentage of tangible assets to total assets. As a consequence, more R&D intensive industries and industries where more specific knowledge is generated are more likely to suffer from severe agency problems. Therefore, staging should be more valuable for higher uncertainty over the future outcome and for lower percentages of tangible assets.
In order to analyse which factors impact the decision to stage an investment rather than committing all capital upfront I estimated a logit regression with the 0/1 staging decision outcome as the dependent variable. The dependent variables include the industry Dummies (i.e. whether the investment target belongs to one of the industries described in chapter 2.2), the Age of the investment target at the date of the first investment to proxy for the riskiness of the investment, a dummy variable taking on the values 1 if the first round of investment has been made in a The results indicate that none of the industry dummies has a significant influence on the decision to stage an investment. So there, does not seem to be support for the claim that skills of the Venture Capital provider are complementary to certain technologies in general. An industry per se is not associated with a higher level of staging. Thus, I cannot find evidence for the claim of Gompers (1995) that research-intensive industries are likely to exhibit a higher level of staging activities. At least, the industry itself does not represent a factor explaining why firms in specific industries are subject to sequential capital infusions rather than lump-sum payments upfront.
However, the data reveals that age as a measure of the riskiness of the venture and the possible lack of a corporate history makes it more difficult for the financing firm to judge upon future prospects. The coefficient associated with the variable "Age at Investment" is negative and significant in all five regression specifications. The significance varies between the 1% and the 10% level. Additionally, The dummy variables "Start Up" and "Early Stage" are positive and significant in all five regressions. If an investment is made at an earlier stage of the financing life cycle, the risk of failing is much higher than in later stages. Therefore, VC firms tend to portion their payments into successive stages rather providing a lump sum payment upfront. To control for additional size characteristics in the regression I have included information about the sales and employees at the date of investment into the analysis. The variable "Employees at Investment" is positive and significant in regression specification 2 at the 1% level indicating that a higher level of employees is associated with a higher probability of staging. This effect is confirmed by average number of employees, that is also significant at the 1% level and exhibits a positive coefficient. Moreover, the coefficient associated with the sales variable is positive and significant for the number of sales at the investment date, but not for the average number of sales.
Concerning the impact of the size variables, studies have revealed the difficulty of VC providers to supply capital to larger firms. Lockett and Wright (1999) emphasized that size variables play an important role for the decision to syndicate an investment, when VC firms want to avoid clustering risks or when the firm is simply to large for the corresponding VC firm. Syndication of Venture Capital involves the co-investment of different partners as opposed to a deal where only a single partner is involved. Hopp and Rieder (2005) find that the num-ber of sales influences the decision to co-invest positively. Consequently, when size affects the decision to make an investment by oneself, it can well be that the partners focus on different stages of the life cycle where each party provides the money for different rounds and can still focus on their respective skills and expertise. As a consequence, a larger size of the funded firm as proxied by the number of employees and sales involves a higher need for staging and syndication simultaneously.
Overall, I find evidence that the higher the uncertainty associated with a deal the higher is the degree of asymmetric information and as such monitoring and staging mechanisms are more likely to be put in place by the VC provider to control the entrepreneurs effort. 
Firm characteristics and the Number of Financing Rounds
The size of the funding rounds and along with the total number of funding events is an important measure of stage financing. The number of funding rounds should be positively related to the inherent uncertainty over the expected future outcome and to the expected agency costs. VC firms can add value through monitoring activities when the level of asymmetric information is high. Gompers (1995) points out that a higher level of intangible assets to the amount of total assets should be associated with higher agency costs. More tangible assets would yield a higher liquidation value and in consequence losses from committing to much capital to inefficient firms are mitigated. Additionally, the need to make more intensive use of staging and monitoring becomes more pronounced in earlier stages of the investment life cycle. VC providers get to know more about the company over the lifetime of their relationship which should lead to lower incentives for monitoring.
One would expect to see a larger number of stages for riskier firms with more uncertain growth prospects. In order to test the relationship between the characteristics of the funded companies and the intensity of monitoring and staging activities I estimate a Poisson regression testing the impact of firm characteristics on the number of financing rounds per funded company. The number of stages the financed firm went through is the dependent and the industry dummies, the age of the firm at the first investment date, the stage dummies alongside with the size variables are used again as the explanatory variables. Table 5 presents the results from the regression analysis estimating the impact of funded firm characteristics on the number of financing rounds per firm. Among the various industry categories the dummy variable associated with the Biotech industry is positive and significant at the 1% and 5% level indicating that a larger number of financing rounds is associated with the firms in this industry. The coefficients for the Industrial Services and Industrial Products sector have the expected negative sign, but are, however, not significant at conventional levels. So there is evidence that research-intensive industries are likely to exhibit a higher level of staging activities. It does not necessarily mean that VC providers stage generally more, but when it comes to staging the monitoring activities are more intense. The same effect can be found for firms in the Pharmaceutical industry (in regressions (1), (2) and (3)) and Medical (in regressions (3) and (5)). As in the previous analysis the coefficient for the age variable is found to be negative and statistically significant. So, again, the more uncertain the growth prospects are the more likely it is that staging is used and, more importantly, intensified. A higher firm age is therefore associated with a lower number of financing rounds. The higher the uncertainty associated with a deal the higher is the degree of asymmetric information and therefore monitoring and staging mechanisms are used more intensively by the VC provider to control the entrepreneurs effort. Fur-thermore, I find that the size variables included show the same impact as on the propensity to stage an investment. The number of employees at the investment date as well as the average over the investigation period influences the number of financing rounds positively. Additionally, the "Sales at Investment" coefficient is again positive and significant indicating that larger sales are associated with a larger number of stages (likely with a larger number of co-investors).
Moreover, the analysis reveals that the need to make more intensive use of staging and monitoring becomes more pronounced in earlier stages of the investment life cycle. The coefficients associated with the dummy variables indicating at which stage the first investment has been made are positive and significant (Early Stage at the 1% level across all specifications and Start Up at the 5% level in 2 out of 5 regressions and at the 10% level in 3 out of 5 regressions). So in the earlier years of collaboration between the Venture Capital provider and the financed firm the need for monitoring and staging is significantly more pronounced. 
VC Providers and the Need for Staging
Analysing the need for staging solely from the side of the investment targets falls short of taking into consideration the characteristics of the VC firms providing the capital. If staging is employed as a tool for mitigating risks in VC financing (as the results from the last two chapters suggest) then one should in addition be able to see which factors drive the need for employing staging mechanisms from the side of the financing firms. In order to keep the entrepreneurs on a tighter leash staging mechanisms can be employed to reduce the downside exposure for the investments made. Moreover, the inherent skill set of the financing firms also affects the need to make use of staged capital infusions.
Venture Capital financing involves not only money for funding growth opportunities but also includes help in guiding managerial decisions and bring in network linkages that benefit the financed firm. This characteristic is often referred to as "Smart Money". As such, some firms might be better equipped to deal with the difficulties and problems faced in venture capital financing. For some firms it could therefore be beneficial to invest with other partners in firms, where each firm contributes its share and might concentrate on specific rounds. Thus, it could well be that there are preferences among the VC providers for certain stages or rounds within the financing cycle of the investment target. 
Where S i denotes the relative share of a certain industry (stage) in the overall portfolio. Therefore the closer H is to one, the more the VC´s deals are concentrated within a few industry segments (stages).
The results are reported in table 6. We can infer that despite the first regression specification the coefficients associated with the VC category dummies are not found to be significant across all specifications. As such, I do not find evidence that certain groups of VC firms differ with respect to the general use of staging mechanisms when financing young start-ups. Thus, I cannot confirm the results found in Tykvova (2004) that German VC firms are less sophisticated than corresponding foreign counterparts. Differences between the groups are not found to be statistically significant. In addition, the coefficient associated with the variable "Number of Investments" is not statistically significant. More experienced VCs, as proxied by the number of deals they already have undertaken, are not more likely to make use of staging. However, I find that the variables "Capital under Management", "Sum invested in Germany" and "Percentage invested in Germany" are significant at the 1% level in regression (2) till (4). The Capital under Management and the overall Sum invested in Germany have a positive coefficient indicating that firms with larger fund volume and more funds invested in Germany are more likely to make use of staging, which indeed indicates that more experienced VCs, as proxied by their capital in-and outflow, are more likely to make use of staging.
With respect to the two concentration measures included I find that those have a contrary effect on the average number of financing rounds employed. The coefficient associated with the concentration over phases (stages) is negative and significant (at the 1% level) indicating that firms that concentrate on particular stages on the financing life cycle do not employ a higher number of financing rounds. VC firms that clearly concentrate and specialize on the required needs of funded firms at certain stages of the life cycle do not need to make more extensive use of stage financing in order to mitigate risks. However, I do find that firms focusing more general on industry segments do in fact acknowledge the value of spreading risks across stages. The coefficient is positive and significant, albeit only marginally in the second and third regression specification.
In addition, I find that firms that are more active in the German market are less prone to make use of staging as a risk mitigation tool. The coefficient associated with the variable "Percentage invested in Germany" is negative and significant indicating that those firms that invest more of their funds in Germany make less use of staging. Inexperienced VCs are not only likely to be more uncertain about the prospects of the Venture, but might also be more unfamiliar with the particularities of the German market itself. By employing more intense monitoring the VC can permanently update its information and can commit further capital to promote growth once new information arrives over time. For VC firms more acquainted with the German market, monitoring activities cannot add as much value. The extent to which staging is used as a mechanism for downside protection is limited. So, here we have to distinguish between two different effects found. Those variables indicating experience in deal making and structuring (Capital under Management and Total Funds invested) suggest that more experienced VC firms make more use of staging. However, the size of the fund volume (as measured by Capital under Management) that can be invested globally does not say much about the need to specifically spread risks when investing in Germany. Unfamiliarity can still affect the need to employ round financing as a tool for risk mitigation. Thus, I find that familiarity with the German VC market in particular affects the extent to which firms make use of staging negatively. Firms more acquainted with the culture and possibly with more access to deals do not have to make use of staging as the value of the downside protection and the additional monitoring effort is eroded.
With respect to the dummy variables indicating the focus of the investment firms, one can see from table 6 that firms focusing on certain industries are less likely to finance firms in a larger number of rounds. The coefficients for the "Non-High Tech" and the "Information Technology" variable are found to be negative and statistically significant (at the 1% and 5% level respectively). Here I find again evidence that those firms that acquired more specific knowledge within a market segment are less prone to finance in rounds, as the benefit from staging is lower.
Staging of venture capital is fostered by the idea of information becoming available over time thus reducing uncertainty. Industries where more specific knowledge is generated are more likely to suffer from severe agency problems. However, agency problems are not only reduced by information gathering through monitoring or staging activities. Venture Capital providers can likewise, acquire skills and expertise in industry segments or stages in order to reduce the potential conflicts with the entrepreneur. Consequently, the need for a staged investment structure is reduced and expertise can substitute for monitoring activities. The value from continuous monitoring is therefore higher for firms not acquainted with the market in general or for firms that invest in a broader scope across industry segments and which do not acquire specific industry knowledge. 
The Intersection of Staging and Syndication
The last chapter has shown that staging the investment can be seen as a tool to mitigate the risks inherent in financing young and risky start-ups with uncertain growth prospects. In fact, staging can serve as a downside protection for VC firms. I showed that especially firms with more capital to invest make more use of staging while firms that invest more heavily in certain industries rely less on stage financing.
The role played by venture capital providers in the financing process goes beyond the mere provision of money. Brander et al. (2005) point out the value adding effect of syndication activities and Hopp and Rieder (2006) and Audretsch and Lehmann (2004) empirically show that syndication of investments can lead to higher sales growth for the firms funded through an investment syndicate. Fluck, Garrison and Myers (2005) present a model of venture capital contracting that incorporates moral hazard, and asymmetric information problems. They show that later stage syndication of venture capital investments alleviates the agency problems between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur. Syndication reduces the monopoly power of the financing firm and thus induces the entrepreneur to put in more effort, which consequently benefits the venture capital provider due to the increased value of the venture. Fluck et al point out that the commitment to syndicate can protect the entrepreneur from dilution and thus mitigates the problem of hold-up. The commitment to syndicate therefore assures a higher effort of the entrepreneur and yields more favourable financing terms in return.
Recent studies argue that there are two main motives that complement each other when explaining why VC firms choose to co-invest with a partner: the risk-mitigating perspective and the resource-based perspective [Hopp and Rieder (2005) , Brander et al. (2002) , Manigart et al. (2005) ]. The Risk Mitigating Perspective is to see syndication as a mean for venture capitalists to build up a well-diversified portfolio and reduce risk without reducing return, while the resource-based approach, however, sees the VC market as a pool of productive resources in which a VC organisation can access resources of another venture capitalist through syndication [Manigart et al. (2005) , Bygrave (1987) ]. At the pre-investment stage, Lerner (1994) suggests the Selection Hypothesis as a rationale for VC syndication. Under this hypothesis the evaluation process before the selection of an investment opportunity is undertaken by more than one venture capitalist. The evaluation of the same venture proposal by different VC companies operating in a syndicate reduces therefore the potential danger of adverse selection [Lerner (1994) and Houben (2002) ]. The Value Added Hypothesis in terms of managerial activities is a resource-based motive for syndication, which holds for the post-investment stage. Under the Value Added Hypothesis venture capitalists are considered to add value to the performance of the venture after they invested their capital. The benefit of involving co-investors is derived from heterogeneous skills and information different venture capitalists can contribute to the management of the venture company. The need for such additional resources is anticipated to be greater in earlier stages of an investment, than in later-stage investments.
So if staging acts as a risk mitigation tool one should also see an impact of the overall staging activities on the level of syndication that different VCs make use of. Following the view that staging limits the downside exposure and syndication serves as a tool to built a well diversified portfolio there should be an impact of the extent to which VC firms employ staging on their overall propensity to co-invest deals. Moreover, one should see an impact of staging activities once there is a benefit of involving partners into later rounds. If the commitment to syndicate can mitigate the hold-up problem and align the interests of the VC and the entrepreneur (as argued by Fluck et al. (2005) ), the firms that stage and monitor more extensively should also be more inclined to involve partners in the financing process.
In order to test the relationship between staging and syndication I calculated the syndication ratio for all VC investors. The syndication ratio gives the number of the total co-invested deals to the overall number of transactions of a VC provider. It thus indicates which percentage of deals a VC has undertaken jointly with a partner. Here it does not matter in which round the investors made their investment, so each VC provider can focus on their desired round and let another partner invest capital in later rounds so to keep the successive capital infusion effect alive. In the following I estimated a tobit regression using the syndication ratio of a VC provider as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are:
The VC category as introduced in chapter 2.3, The total number of investments by a VC, the portfolio concentration over phases of the life-cycle and industries as introduced in the last chapter, and information on the investment focus and the overall capacity to invest. The results are reported in table 7. The table reports a Tobit regression model estimating the impact of Venture Capital provider characteristics on the syndication ratio. The syndication ratio measures the number of joint investments as a percentage of the total number of transactions undertaken. The sample for the first regression includes 432 Venture Capital providers that have made at least one investment in the period 1995-2005. Additionally, the regressions include information on the average number of round financing used for the investments made, a Herfindahl measure of concentration for the industries invested in as well as for the concentration on stages (i.e. Start Up/Seed, Early Stage and Late Stage). For regression (2) I additionally included the Capital under Management for the VC firm which enters the regression as the log. Moreover, I have included a dummy variable indicating the investment focus of the VC firm, i.e. whether the focus is on Non High-Tech, Information Technology, Medical and Life Sciences Products, or no specified focus at all. For regression (3) the sample has been reduced to 312 VC firms. Regression (3) uses the total Sum of investments (enters the regression as the log) made in Germany by the respective VC provider, whereas regression (4) includes the investments made in Germany as a percentage of the overall sum of investments made. The table reports the coefficient estimate along with the p-values in parentheses. Intercepts are not shown. The variable Co-Operative VC has been dropped. The variable Business Angel has not been included. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively.
First of all, table 7 reports that none of the VC category dummies is significant (despite the dummy for Independent in the first regression). Therefore, the VCs do not differ in their corresponding use of syndication, which again displays that none of the categories is more or less experienced in structuring deals and as such differences in neither the level of staging nor the level of syndication can be attributed to one of the VC categories. In addition, I find that (as opposed to the previous analysis on staging) the variables representing capital in-and outflow are not found to be significant. Neither the amount of percentage of investments made in Germany not the overall amount of capital under management has an impact on the level of syndication activity. For the focus dummies I find that firms active in the Non High Tech segment make less use of syndication, indicating again that those firms need not rely on too much outside help as they already posses specific skills and knowledge needed to get access to deals in that industry and to structure them appropriately. Additionally, the coefficient associated with the dummy variable "Medical" is positive and significant in two out of three regressions. Here, one can see that the need to involve partners and to lever up on heterogeneous skills is more pronounced in research-intensive industries. Additionally, I find that the coefficient for the industry concentration is positive and significant (at the 1% level) confirming the view that syndication can serve as a mean to lever upon skills and expertise of a partner firm. In line with the argumentation in Brander et al. (2002) I find that those firms with a higher focus on certain industry segments are more likely to involve partners.
With respect to the influence of staging on syndication activities table 7 reports that the coefficient for the average number of rounds for the VCs is positive and significant meaning that a VC firm with a higher average number of financing rounds employed is also more likely to syndicate an investment with a partner VC. This supports the view that more experienced firms are more likely to stage and also make use of syndication at the same token.
In order to make more concise inferences about the relationship between staging and syndication I have estimated another regression using the same explanatory variables and the ratio of syndicated investments in a narrower sense as the dependent variable. Here I considered an investment only to be syndicated when the investment has been made by two or more parties within the same round of financing. The ratio is again calculated as the total number of investments where a VC has undertaken a deal jointly in one of the rounds with a partner over the total number of deals. Using the narrower version of the syndication ratio allows for deeper insights into the impact of staging on joint decision making. The table reports a Tobit regression model estimating the impact of Venture Capital provider characteristics on the narrower version of the syndication ratio. The narrower version of the syndication ratio measures the number investments with joint investment activity by two or more partners in one of the financing rounds as a percentage of the total number of transactions undertaken. The sample for the first regression includes 432 Venture Capital providers that have made at least one investment in the period 1995-2005. Additionally, the regressions include information on the average number of round financing used for the investments made, a Herfindahl measure of concentration for the industries invested in as well as for the concentration on stages (i.e. Start Up/Seed, Early Stage and Late Stage). For regression (2) I additionally included the Capital under Management for the VC firm which enters the regression as the log. Moreover, I have included a dummy variable indicating the investment focus of the VC firm, i.e. whether the focus is on Non High-Tech, Information Technology, Medical and Life Sciences Products, or no specified focus at all. For regression (3) the sample has been reduced to 312 VC firms. Regression (3) uses the total Sum of investments (enters the regression as the log) made in Germany by the respective VC provider, whereas regression (4) includes the investments made in Germany as a percentage of the overall sum of investments made. The table reports the coefficient estimate along with the p-values in parentheses. Intercepts are not shown. The variable Co-Operative VC has been dropped. The variable Business Angel has not been included. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively. Table 8 reveals that, again, the coefficient associated with the average number of rounds invested is positive and significant across all regression specifications.
Here we can see, that those firms that make more use of staging are more inclined to work with a partner jointly when making investment decisions. Moreover, the coefficient for the investors focusing on Non High Tech firms is negative and significant indicating that those VC firms focusing on industries that generate less specific knowledge and possibly show a lower level of asymmetric information are less inclined to co-invest their deals. However, for the Medical VC firms I find that the reliance on partners in the investment process is more pronounced. The coefficient for the focus variable "Medical" is positive and significant in all three regressions (at the 5% level). Moreover, the coefficient for industry concentration is positive and significant.
In addition, I find that the coefficient for the foreign VC dummy is positive and significant in the last three regressions (at the 5% level). One can see that foreign investors, who presumably are less acquainted with the German market, make more use of syndication in a narrower sense and are more inclined to involve a partner into the decision making process in order to reduce the level of asymmetric information.
I find that firms which realize the benefit of staging might on the same turn realize the value added in financing Start Ups by involving partners to create complementarities in managing and advising the funded firms as well as by combining financial resources. By staging over the financing life cycle it has been pointed out that continuous monitoring and information gathering has a value enhancing effect. In addition this also confirms the argumentation put forward by Fluck at al. (2005) who have shown that later stage syndication adds value for the financing firms as well as for the entrepreneur.Later stage syndication thus alleviates the agency problems between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur. Consequently, VC firms that make use of staging are also more open to syndication. Gompers (1995) points out that the duration between the funding events can be interpreted as a measure for the intensity of monitoring activities. The higher the expected agency costs the shorter should the duration between the funding rounds be. Therefore, the shorter the duration between the events of capital infusions the more frequently the VC provider monitors the entrepreneur. According to Gompers (2004) early stage companies have short or no corporate histories and evaluation of growth prospects becomes more difficult in these phases, which makes monitoring more worthwhile for the investor. The same holds true for high technology companies, where the complementarities between the managerial skills of the VC provider and the tangible assets are more pronounced.
Duration of Financing Rounds
Moreover, the size of the funding rounds and along with the total number of funding events is an important measure of stage financing. Gompers (1995) finds that firms that go public receive the largest amount of funding and are on average funded during more financing events than firms that are acquired or go bankrupt. In addition early stage firms receive less money per investment round whereas the amount invested increase over the life cycle of the firm, when asset tangibility increases. The duration of financing generally increases in later stages. Moreover, he finds that the higher the level of tangible assets the longer is the duration of the financing round.
Because of the high uncertainty and risk involved with the investment, the successive capital infusion is potentially decisive. Stage financing allows the prospects of the firm to be reevaluated periodically. The shorter the duration of an individual round of financing, the more frequently the venture capitalist monitors the entrepreneur's progress. In order to test the relationship between funding duration and funded firm characteristics I estimate a Weibull Duration model using the time between successive financing rounds as the dependent variable. The sample under consideration uses only firms that have been subject to at least two rounds of venture capital financing in order to test the influence of funded firm characteristics on the duration of the financing rounds. As the explanatory variables I use the industry dummies for the financed firms, along with the age and size variables (sales and employees) of the firm at the investment date. As opposed to the analysis in chapter 3.1 and 3.2 I use the age and size of the firm at each successive financing round to account for changes in the risk profile of the firm and its influence on the duration of the corresponding financing round. In addition to the characteristics of the funded firm I included information about the structure of the provided financing. As pointed out earlier, syndication should serve not only as a mean to diversify the portfolio but also as a tool to lever upon partner capabilities. As a consequence I included several measures estimating the impact of partner involvement on the financing duration. First of all I added a dummy variable equaling one when the financing rounds are made by more than a single VC firm ("Syndicated") along with a dummy variable indicating whether the current round of financing has been provided by more than a single VC firm ("Narrow Syndication"). These two variables capture the impact that the involvement of a partner, and as such the acquisition of a new set of capabilities and skills, might have on the time span for which the money is provided. In addition, I included the number of syndicated rounds ("Syndicated Rounds") along with the number of total investors ("Investors") into the analysis. Table 9 reports the results from the duration analysis estimating the impact of firm characteristics on the duration of a particular financing round. Among the industry dummies solely the coefficient for the firms in the Energy and Utilities sector is found to be positive and significant saying that here the financing rounds last longer and less monitoring is required. Therefore, when funding firms from this industry VC firms are not forced to keep the firms on a tighter leash, as in other industries. For the remaining dummy variables none of the coefficient is found to impact the duration of financing rounds (despite Consulting and Services at the 5% level in the first regression). However, I find evidence that the duration of financing increases in later stages of investment. The coefficient for the "Start Up" dummy, indicating whether an investment has been made at the earliest stage of the financing life cycle is negative and significant in all 6 regressions. Thus, when an investment is made in the Start Up stage money is provided for a shorter period of time. When the investment is, however, made in a later stage the duration increases. This suggests, that the VC providers get to know more about the company over the lifetime of their relationship and also that the portfolio companies themselves can show their ability to generate money, which in turn leads to less monitoring and consequently to longer financing durations later on. Additionally, I find that the variables displaying whether an investment has been subject to syndication has an influence on the financing duration. Syndication itself, involving a co-investment in the current or some of the further rounds is not statistically significant. The variable of narrow syndication, indicating whether the investment has been made simultaneously in a particular round, is reported to be positive and significant. This suggests, that when more than a single party is involved in evaluating the deal and providing money, the financing duration increases. This suggests evidence for Lerner's Selection Hypothesis. Lerner (1994) argues that the evaluation of the same venture proposal by different VC companies operating in a syndicate reduces the potential danger of adverse selection. Transferred to the case of deciding whether to fund a new firm or to provide capital for an additional round of funding, one can see that if the evaluation process before the selection of an investment opportunity is undertaken by more than one venture capitalist, the duration of the financing round increases. As Sah and Stiglitz (1986) point out, the decision making process is more efficient and leads to better results if the project is only undertaken when approved by two or more parties. Consequently, the involvement of a partner into a round of financing increases the duration of financing provided and likewise reduces the incentive for monitoring the firm's prospects.
As a second measure for the efficiency of joint investment proposals I have included the number of syndicated rounds. The coefficient for this variable is again positive and significant. This confirms the result pointed out above that if more investors are involved into a joint decision making process the VC providers are able to reduce the potential risk stemming from asymmetric information and therefore agency problems can be mitigated more efficiently. Moreover, I have included the total number of investors which is found to be non significant. A larger number investors does not have an impact on the duration of financing rounds and affect the incentive for monitoring. It is more important to combine efforts of the involved parties rather than simply let somebody else finance a later round. Moreover, letting a subsequent round being financed by a third party could induce even more agency problems among the involved parties.
Overall, I find evidence for an effect of joint decision making on mitigating agency conflicts between the VC provider and the entrepreneur. Involving partners into the decision-making process before the decision to fund a new investment proposal or an additional round of financing increase the duration of the financing round and therefore reduces the incentive to monitor the firm more closely. Gompers (1995) points out the impact of funded firm characteristics on the duration of financing rounds and also argues that the amount of funding provided by the VC providers should be dependent on the riskiness of the growth prospects and the level of corporate history which makes the evaluation of growth prospects less difficult. In the previous analysis I found that the duration of financing rounds is longer for investments made in Start Up and Seed stages. Moreover, I find that partner involvement lengthens the duration of financing rounds and lowers the incentive for subsequent monitoring. Thus, the potential screening by multiple partners gives all involved parties more faith in the financing decision and therefore reduces the need for subsequent monitoring.
Investment Amount provided in Financing Rounds
In the step I want to analyze the impact that the factors pointed out in the last chapter have on the overall amount of funding provided. Gompers (1995) , for example, found that in later stages, given the lower level of risk involved and the higher need for funding more capital-intensive investment projects, the amount of funding increases. Consequently, I will in the following analyze the impact that the characteristics of the funded firms have on the amount of capital provided. I estimate an OLS regression using the amount of funding provided in each financing round as the dependent variable. The sample under consideration uses all firms that have been funded at least once during the financing cycle. If firms are subject to more financing rounds they appear as often as they receive funding in the dataset. The variables used reflect, of course, the firm size and age at the corresponding investment dates. As the explanatory variables I use the industry dummies for the financed firms, along with the age and the size variables (sales and employees) of the firm at the investment date. In addition to the characteristics of the funded firm I included information about the structure of the provided financing. First of all I added a dummy variable equaling one when the financing rounds are made by more than a single VC firm ("Syndicated") along with a dummy variable indicating whether the current round of financing has been provided by more than a single VC firm ("Narrow Syndication"). In addition, I included the number of syndicated rounds ("Syndicated Rounds") and the number of total investors ("Investors") into the analysis.
From the regression results presented in table 10 we can infer that none of the industry dummies is significant at conventional levels, indicating that there is no industry effect on the funding amount provided. Table 10 reports that the coefficient associated with the dummy variable "Start Up" is negative and statistically significant. This shows that the amount of capital provided in earlier rounds is significantly less than in later rounds. I find that that for younger firms the staging effect is more pronounced (financing duration is shorter and monitoring is more intense) and less capital is provided. Thus, for older firms more information can be gathered and the potential of the venture can be more easily judged upon, which in turn decreases the potential risk taken on by the venture capitalist. As a consequence staging becomes less valuable to the VC provider. This effect is supported by the coefficient of the size variable "Employees at Investment" that is positive and significant. This underpins the role of an already established business model and potentially an already proven track record in order to signal the capability to turn an idea into corporate value. The later the stage of investment and the more the management of the firm has been able to prove their skills the higher will the amount be that the venture firms invests. According to Davila et al. (2003) the funding events do not only present a pure transfer of financial resources but also they are involved in redefining a portfolio company's governance structure and provide signals about the future growth prospects. The size of the provided amount therefore plays a more important role in stipulating growth. VC providers permit their portfolio companies different growth strategies with different levels of funding provided. As a consequence those funded firms with a larger cash flow available can invest more heavily and grow faster.
The dummy variable "Staging" shows that stage financing in general does not lead to a higher or lower amount per financing round. However, the two dummies "Syndication" and "Narrow Syndication" have a positive and significant coefficient meaning that the amount provided for the funded companies is increasing when more than a single VC firm makes the investment. This again, emphasizes the value added effect that stems from involving a partner in order to mitigate the potential difficulties in estimating the prospects of the venture and to alleviate the agency problems in the VC -Entrepreneur relationship. In addition, the number of syndicated rounds impacts the amount provided positively and also the number of investors increases the amount provided per financing round.
It can therefore be shown that when multiple VC firms make an investment, the average investment amount provided is higher than in the single investor case. Therefore, the investors do not simply split the total amount among all investors, but rather the overall "pie" increases as all investors contribute more money when joint by a partner. Again, the evaluation of the venture proposal by different VC companies operating in a syndicate reduces adverse selection. Consequently, the decision making process becomes more efficient and leads to better results if the project is only undertaken when approved by two or more parties. Thus, the involvement of a partner increases the confidence of the VC firms in the funded firm and leads them to provide more financing on average. 
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The table reports a OLS regression model using robust Standard Errors (Huber/White/sandwich) estimating the impact of financed firms characteristics on the amount provided in the individual financing rounds. The sample for the first regression includes 493 Venture Capital transactions in the period 1995-2005. For regression (2) I additionally included a variable that indicates whether the investment has been made by a syndicate. Regression (3) includes a variable indicating whether a particular round has been subject to joint investment activity. Regression (4) includes a term measuring the number of total rounds that have been syndicated and regression (5) includes the total number of investors. Regression (6) and (7) control for the size of the venture at the time of investment in terms of employees and sales respectively. The industry variables were included in all regression specifications, but none of the coefficients was significant, despite Utilities in regression (6) at the 5% level with a positive coefficient, Biotech in regression (7) at the 1% level and Internet at the 5% level, both with a positive coefficient. For reasons of brevity the coefficient estimates and the corresponding p-values of the insignificant industry dummies are not shown here. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively.
Summary and Conclusion
In this paper I analyze the determinants of staging and monitoring activities of Venture Capital providers using a unique, hand collected data set of Venture Capital deals in Germany over the period 1995 -2005. Concerning the role of venture capital providers, I show that the use of a staged financial structure can be as important as the pure provision of capital. Overcoming the problem of asymmetric information and monitoring the activities of portfolio firms can be valuable. I find that staging becomes more valuable the higher the uncertainty over the future outcome will be and the less tangible the assets of the firms funded are. The analysis reveals that the need to make more intensive use of staging and monitoring is more pronounced in earlier stages of the investment life cycle. VC providers get to know more about the company over the lifetime of their relationship and also the portfolio companies themselves can show their ability to generate money, which leads to lower incentives for monitoring. The higher the uncertainty associated with a deal the higher is the degree of asymmetric information and as such monitoring and staging mechanisms are more likely to be put in place by the VC provider to control the entrepreneurs effort.
In addition, I find that VC firms less active in the German market are more prone to make use of staging as a risk mitigation tool. By employing more intense monitoring the VC can permanently update its information and can commit further capital to promote growth once new information arrives over time. Industries where more specific knowledge is generated are more likely to suffer from severe agency problems. The analysis shows that agency problems are not only reduced by information gathering through monitoring or staging activities but Venture Capital providers can likewise acquire skills and expertise in industry segments or stages in order to reduce the potential conflicts with the entrepreneur. Consequently, the need for a staged investment structure is reduced and expertise can substitute for monitoring activities.
In addition, I analyze the relationship of staging and syndication activities and find that firms that make more use of staging are more inclined to work with a partner jointly when making investment decisions. However, those VC firms focusing on industries that generate less specific knowledge, and possibly show a lower level of asymmetric information, are less inclined to co-invest their deals. Firms which realize the benefit of staging also realize the value added in financing Start Ups by involving partners to create complementarities in managing and advising the funded firms. Syndication of venture capital investments alleviates the agency problems between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur and consequently, VC firms that make use of staging are also more open to syndication.
When investigating the impact of funded firm characteristics on the duration of the financing rounds the data indicates that the duration of financing increases in later stages of investment. If an investment is made in the Start Up stage money is provided for a shorter period of time. When the investment is, however, made in a later stage the effect on the duration vanishes, which suggests, that the VC providers get to know more about the company over the lifetime of their relationship, which leads to less monitoring. Furthermore, I find evidence for Lerner's Selection Hypothesis according to which the evaluation of the same venture proposal by different VC companies operating in a syndicate reduces the potential danger of adverse selection. One can see that if the evaluation process before the selection of an investment opportunity is undertaken by more than one venture capitalist, the duration of the financing round increases. Consequently, the involvement of a partner into a round of financing increases the duration of financing provided and likewise reduces the incentive for monitoring the funded firm's prospects. Moreover, the analysis of the average amount of funding provided supports the argument of improvements on deal selection through joint investment activity. When multiple VC firms make an investment, the average investment amount provided is higher than in the single investor case. The findings have several implications. In particular they suggest that joint decision making can improve deal selection and reduce information asymmetries. The involvement of a partner increases the confidence of the VC providers in the funded firm and leads them to provide more financing on average and for a longer period of time.
For future research it might be worthwhile to further investigate the determinants of control mechanisms in venture financing by paying attention to the role of joint investment activities. Thus, it can be a rewarding task to investigate the role of reputation and previous deal selection on the joint investment behavior of Venture Capital providers in the sense of Hochberg et al. (2005) . If Venture Capital firms form syndicates to benefit from a second opinion in the investment selection process and for subsequent investment decisions, it could be an interesting avenue for further research to analyze with whom VC providers form alliances in order to better understand the mechanics behind syndicate formation. Moreover, it might be worthwhile to estimate the impact of staging and syndication on firm performances using actual outcome data in order to quantify the value added effect of monitoring and control mechanisms.
